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Over the past year, the reported opinions covered a range of subjects,
including redhibition,' specific performance, 2 subrogation,' indemnity,4
proof of agreements,' interpretation of contracts,' compromises,7 third-
party purchasers,' abuse of rights, 9 error, 0 stipulations pour autri,"
unjust enrichment, 2 public contracts, 3 contribution,"1 repossession," ca-
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pacity,' 6 fraudulent conveyances, 17 and quasi contracts.' 8 The following
discussion covers a few of the highlights.
"Fraudulent" Conveyances and Timely Revocations
Prior to January 1, 1985, the law of Louisiana provided a creditor
a device to annul any contract made in fraud of his rights-the revocatory
action.' 9 The procedural scheme for this action allowed the creditor to
wait to file his suit until he liquidated his claim against the debtor.
Thus, the one year prescriptive period governing the revocatory action
did not begin to run until the creditor received a judgment against the
debtor.20
In 1984, the legislature, as part of the comprehensive revision of
the law of obligations,2 modified the revocatory action. Under the new
law, the underlying cause for revocation is not limited to fraud; it
includes any act of the debtor that causes or increases the debtor's
insolvency. 2 Further, the legislature revised the prescriptive period so
that the one year window for the creditor's institution of the action
commences to run from the time the creditor has actual or constructive
knowledge of the relevant act or omission of the debtor, with a maximum
time of three years. 23
In Thomassie v. Savoie, the first circuit court of appeal addressed
the question whether to apply retroactively the new formula of pre-
scription. Jerry Thomassie, Jr. suffered permanent and disfiguring in-
juries as a result of a gunshot wound inflicted by Jerry Savoie in 1982.
Within six months of the shooting, Mr. Savoie made an inter vivos
16. E.g., In re Adoption of Smith, 578 So. 2d 988 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
17. E.g., Thomassie v. Savoie, 581 So. 2d 1031 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991).
18. E.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Turner, 577 So. 2d 1219 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1991); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Vanzant, 580 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1991).
19. La. Civ. Code art. 1969 (1870) read, in part, as follows: "[Elvery act done by
a debtor with the intent of depriving his creditor of the eventual right he has upon the
property of such debtor, is illegal, and ought, as respects such creditor, to be avoided."
Further, La. Civ. Code art. 1970 (1870) said this: "The law gives to every creditor ...
an action to annul any contract made in fraud of their rights."
20. La. Civ. Code art. 1994 (1870): "The action ... is limited to one year; if brought
by a creditor individually, to be counted from the time he has obtained judgment [on
the underlying action] against the debtor ... 
21. 1984 La. Acts No. 331.
22. La. Civ. Code art. 2036: "An obligee has a right to annul an act of the obligor,
or the result of a failure to act of the obligor, made or effected after the right of the
obligee arose, that causes or increases the obligor's insolvency."
23. La. Civ. Code art. 2041: "The action of the obligee must be brought within one
year from the time he learned or should have learned of the act, or the result of the
failure to act, of the obligor that the obligee seeks to annul, but never after three years
from the date of that act or result."
24. 581 So. 2d 1031 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991).
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donation conveying an undivided one-half interest in community-owned
real estate to his legally separated spouse. The act of donation provided
that it was a full and final property settlement between the spouses. In
July of 1982, Mr. Thomassie filed a suit based upon his personal injuries
against Mr. Savoie. In February of 1988, the district court entered a
judgment in favor of Mr. Thomassie and against Mr. Savoie for more
than $500,000.00. Four months later, Mr. Thomassie filed a revocatory
action seeking to annul the 1982 donation by Mr. Savoie to Mrs. Savoie.
Based on the amended prescriptive period, the trial court concluded that
Mr. Thomassie's claim had prescribed because he had not filed it within
one year from the time he had actual or constructive knowledge of the
act of donation.Y
The first circuit reversed, disagreeing with the retroactive application
of the amended prescriptive scheme. The court of appeal relied upon
the substantive/procedural distinction in the jurisprudence on statutory
construction 26 in deciding the issue. When a statute is substantive in
nature (i.e., creates, confers, defines or destroys rights, liabilities, causes
of action or legal duties), it should not be invoked retroactively. 2" By
contrast, courts generally apply procedural measures retroactively.28
In the instant matter, the court of appeal determined that the
legislature's revision of the revocatory action was largely substantive-
creating liabilities where none existed before. 29 While acknowledging the
procedural nature of the change to the prescriptive period, the court
stated that "it is inextricably intertwined with Article 2036, which created
a new obligation and which is substantive." 30 Thus, in the words of
the court, "If a statute which is remedial or procedural also has the
effect of making a change in the substantive law, it must be construed
to operate prospectively only."'"
25. The district court also ruled that the donation was not a simulated transfer and
that the donation was not a nullity on the basis of a prohibited substitution. Id. at 1033.
26. E.g., Landry v. Board of Levee Comm'rs, 477 So. 2d 672 (La. 1985); State v.
Alden Mills, 202 La. 416, 12 So. 2d 204 (1943); Young v. American Hoechst Corp., 527
So. 2d 1102 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988); Hawn Tool Co. v. Crystal Oil Co., 514 So. 2d
636 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Manuel v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co., 136 So. 2d 275 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961). See Reichenphader v. Allstate Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 648 (La. 1982);
Lott v. Haley, 370 So. 2d 521 (La. 1979); State v. Landry, 568 So. 2d 1125 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1990). For another interesting view, see Note, Proportionate Prescription-An
Alternative for Applying Changes in Liberative Prescriptive Periods, 43 La. L. Rev. 777
(1983).
27. Thomassie, 581 So. 2d at 1034 (citations omitted).
28. Id. (stating that "Procedural acts describe methods of enforcing, processing,
administering, or determining rights, liabilities or status." (citation omitted)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (citing Manuel v. Carolina Casualty Ins. Co., 136 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1961)).
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Although correct in result, the methodology of the court in Tho-
massie v. Savoie is overly confusing. In 1982, Professor Hargrave offered
a more cogent and concise approach to this problem. It is worth recalling:
The problem is not one of "prospective" or "retroactive"
application of a statute; indeed, confusion could be lessened by
ceasing to use those terms. The Louisiana Constitution, in article
III, section 19, specifies the effective date of statutes. That
provision applies to all statutes-procedural or substantive, re-
medial or non-remedial-and that provision must be given effect.
If the statute specifies a standard of conduct, the standard applies
as of the effective date. If the statute governs court procedure,
it applies to procedures occurring as of the effective date. If a
statute establishes a period of limitation, the statute applies as
of its effective date . . . . This rather simple analysis ... applies
unless some other constitutional provision intervenes. That other
constitutional provision, of course, is the due process clause
which carries with it a flexible prohibition against unreasonable
deprivations of reasonable expectations.32
Identifying Beneficiaries: Reclaiming Payments Not Due
The Louisiana Civil Code recognizes the existence and the enforce-
ability of "quasi contracts." 33 There are two principal kinds of acts that
give rise to these obligations: the transaction of another's business34 and
the payment of a thing not due."
In Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Turner, 6 the third circuit
confronted the latter type of quasi contract. Commercial Union Insurance
Company ("Commercial Union") issued a check payable to the order
of Brenda Turner and Ford Motor Credit Company ("Ford Motor
Credit") ultimately to pay for repairs to Ms. Turner's automobile that
had been damaged in an accident. Commercial Union mistakenly believed
that Ms. Turner held a valid policy with it, covering this loss. Ms.
Turner, however, had cancelled her policy prior to the crash and was
not insured by Commercial Union. Ford Motor Credit held a lien on
the automobile and appeared on an endorsement to Ms. Turner's lapsed
insurance policy. Ms. Turner received the check and presented it to one
32. Hargrave, Louisiana Constitutional Law, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981,
42 La. L. Rev. 596, 601-02 (1982) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
33. La. Civ. Code art. 2293: "Quasi contracts are the lawful and purely voluntary
act of a man, from which there results any obligation whatever to a third person, and
sometimes a reciprocal obligation between the parties."
34. La. Civ. Code arts. 2295-2300.
35. La. Civ. Code arts. 2301-2313.
36. 577 So. 2d 1219 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
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of Ford Motor Credit's representatives for endorsement. The represen-
tative signed on behalf of Ford Motor Credit as follows: "Without
recourse or warranty of prior endorsement." '37 Thereafter, Ms. Turner
entered her endorsement on the check and gave it to the shop that had
repaired her car. After discovering that Ms. Turner's policy was not in
force, Commercial Union filed suit against her and Ford Motor Credit
for the amount of the check it had erroneously issued." Ford Motor
Credit subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting
that it had merely endorsed the check as a convenience to Ms. Turner
and that it had not applied any portion of the check to Ms. Turner's
debt to it.39 The trial court ruled in favor of Ford Motor Credit. 40
In affirming, the appellate court adopted the district court's reasons
for judgment.4 ' While recognizing that a person who has paid money
to another by mistake, thinking he owed a debt, may reclaim what he
has paid, the court said that the recovery is from the one who received
the payment or the benefit.42 In this instance, according to the district
and the intermediate appellate courts, Ford Motor Credit did not receive
anything by endorsing the check. Commercial Union's claim was solely
against Ms. Turner.
The decision is questionable. Ford Motor Credit did receive a benefit
by endorsing the check and playing a role in Commercial Union's paying
for the repairs to Ms. Turner's car. Ford Motor Credit undoubtedly
required Ms. Turner and Commercial Union to list it on the lienholder's
endorsement to the insurance policy-so that it would have a greater
degree of control over its collateral, Ms. Turner's automobile. Ford
Motor Credit's interests were served by Commercial Union's paying for
the repairs. If Ms. Turner were to default on her obligations to Ford
Motor Credit, the likely course of events would include Ford Motor
Credit suing her and seeking possession/ownership of the vehicle. Ford
Motor Credit certainly would be, in that situation, in a better position
if the automobile were in good condition, rather than wrecked.
In New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Vanzant,'4 the -fourth circuit
court of appeal addressed the claim of a judgment debtor, brought
37. Id. at 1220. Further, the Ford Motor Credit representative restricted the payment
to Acadian Body Shop, the outfit that repaired Ms. Turner's vehicle.
38. Commercial Union sought to recover $2,566.55.
39. 577 So. 2d at 1220.
40. The trial court reasoned "that Ford Motor Credit did not receive anything that
was not due it and, therefore, . . . was not liable to Commercial Union." Id.
41. Id. Moreover, the appellate panel stated as follows: "We agree . . that recovery
for a debt not due must be made from the one who received the payment or benefit.
We also agree ... that Ford Motor [Credit) did not receive any payment or benefit .... .
42. Id.
43. 580 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 584 So. 2d 1168'(1991).
19921
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
against both the judgment creditor and his attorneys, that it overpaid
a judgment. In a suit involving a streetcar/automobile accident, the trial
court awarded the plaintiff damages and interest." The judgment debtor
(New Orleans Public Service, Inc. ("NOPSI")) ultimately paid in excess
of $2 million by a draft naming the judgment creditor and his attorneys
as payees. Afterwards, NOPSI determined that the interest demanded
by the judgment creditor's attorneys (and paid by NOPSI) was overstated
by more than $100,000.00. NOPSI filed a suit to recover the overpay-
ment. The trial court entered a judgment against the judgment creditor
and in favor of NOPSI for the amount of the overpayment but sustained
an exception of no cause of action filed on behalf of the attorneys.'
On appeal, NOPSI argued that it was entitled to recover from the
judgment creditor's lawyers. The attorneys contended that they were
disclosed agents of their principal and that the funds transmitted by
NOPSI were owned solely by the judgment creditor. As a consequence,
they urged that they were third persons who did not "receive" the
alleged overpayment within the meaning of article 2031 of the Civil
Code.46
The court of appeal reversed, resolving that NOPSI had stated a
cause of action against the attorneys.47 When NOPSI listed the attorneys
and the judgment creditor as joint payees on the draft, NOPSI paid a
thing not due to both the lawyers and their client. The attorneys were
not third persons as they had urged.'
While not clear cut, the two noted cases suggest the following: when
the maker of a negotiable instrument names a co-payee merely as a
conduit for payment to the other co-payee, the former does not likely
benefit and will not be held liable for reimbursement if the payment
was not due; when, however, a co-payee receives, transmits, partially
44. The compensatory amount was $808,212, and interest exceeded $1 million. Id.
at 534.
45. Id. at 534.
46. La. Civ. Code art. 2301: "He who receives what is not due to him, whether he
receives it through error or knowingly, obliges himself to restore it to' him from whom
he has unduly received it."
47. In so ruling, the fourth circuit declined to follow contrary authority from the
second and third circuits. Louisiana Health Serv. & Indem. Co. v. Cole, 418 So. 2d 1357
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Great American Indem. Co. v. Dauzat, 157 So. 2d 308 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1963).
48. Because of the posture of the case, reviewing the district court's granting of the
attorney's exception of no cause of action, the fourth circuit did not have any evidence
before it that the lawyers had represented the judgment creditor on a contingency fee
arrangement. Nevertheless, the court ventured the following: "(lhf there was an attorney
client contract whereby the attorneys acquired an interest in the suit, La. R.S. 37:218
applies and not only has NOPSI stated a cause of action against these defendants, they
may even be necessary parties to the lawsuit. La.C.C.P. Art. 642." New Orleans Public
Service, Inc. v. Vanzant, 580 So. 2d at 536.
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controls, and has an interest in a payment, he will be held liable with
his fellow co-payee for reimbursement if the payment was not due.
Proof of Agreements-More About Writings
Chapter 8 of Title 10 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes is a portion
of the Uniform Commercial Code that the legislature adopted in 1978.49
Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:8-31950 is the "Statute of Frauds" appli-
cable to the sale of securities. Prior to the decision of the Louisiana
Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Morris v. People's Bank & Trust
Co.," no Louisiana court had interpreted this statute. In this case, Huey
P. Morris alleged, among other things, that Sam J. Friedman, a director
at People's Bank & Trust Co., breached an oral agreement to purchase
Mr. Morris' bank stock upon his retirement as president of the bank."2
The trial court granted Mr. Friedman's motion for summary judgment,
predicated upon the statutory requirement of a writing for the purchase/
sale of securities, and stated: "The motion seems well founded in the
law because LSA-R.S. 10:8-319 clearly requires a writing . . . ."" The
court of appeal affirmed, adopting the reasons of the district court. 4
Because of the lack of jurisprudence in Louisiana construing Revised
Statutes 10:8-319, the district court followed the directive of the supreme
49. 1978 La. Acts No. 165, § I.
50. La. R.S. 10:8-319 (1983):
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless
(a) There is some writing signed by the party against whom enforcement
is sought or by his authorized agent or broker sufficient to indicate that
a contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of described
securities at a defined or stated price; or
(b) Delivery of the security has been accepted or payment has been made
but the contract is enforceable under this provision only to the extent of
such delivery or payment; or
(c) Within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the sale or
purchase and sufficient against the sender under Paragraph (a) has been
received by the party against whom enforcement is sought and he has
failed to send written objection to its contents within ten days after its
receipt, or
(d) The party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading,
testimony or otherwise in court that a contract was made for sale of a
stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated price.
This statute was rewritten by 1989 La. Acts No. 135, § 6.
51. 580 So. 2d 1037 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
52. Paragraph 18 of Mr. Morris' petition alleged that in June and July of 1987, Mr.
Friedman "agreed to buy the stock owned by petitioner on or before August 5, 1987.
Friedman's obligation pursuant to this agreement has not been fulfilled." Id. at 1038.
53. Id. at 1039.
54. Id. at 1038.
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court" and examined the case law in other jurisdictions interpreting that
part of the U.C.C. These authorities have greater meaning when ex-
amined in the context of Mr. Morris' claims.
Mr. Morris argued that the legislation in question does not apply
to private sales of securities or to private agreements to sell securities.
Citing Young v. Simpson,56 the courts disagreed. Mr. Morris was no
more successful in urging that the statute does not apply to transactions
involving shares of financial institutions. The Supreme Court of Kansas
had squarely ruled to the contrary in Midfelt v. Lair." Finally, the
district court and the third circuit rejected Mr. Morris' assertion that
the legislature did not intend Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:8-319 to
supersede or restrict the portions of the Civil Code concerning oral
agreements to buy and sell corporeal and incorporeal movables.1s With
the axiom that the bench should construe several apparently conflicting
statutes so as to give them all effect, the courts stated that Civil Code
article 183219 controlled-"that oral agreements to sell corporeal or
incorporeal movables are enforceable except in cases where other law
requires a written form."' 6
Gulf American Industries v. Airco Industrial Gases6' is instructive,
particularly with respect to the court's treatment of the issues of the
admissibility of parol evidence and the elements of a knowing waiver
of warranty. Usually, a litigant may introduce parol evidence to show
that a contract, in this case a lease evidenced by a writing, was modified
or altered by a subsequent agreement. That litigant, however, may not
rely upon parol evidence "pertaining to matters which preceded the
written lease .... -62 In this suit, Gulf American Industries ("Gulf")
55. Cromwell v. Commerce & Energy Bank, 464 So. 2d 721, 730 (La. 1985): "The
U.C.C. was adopted in Louisiana in an effort to harmonize the commercial law of
Louisiana with that of the other states. We should, therefore, examine the jurisprudence
of other states interpreting [corresponding statutes]."
56. 607 F. Supp. 67, 69 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
57. 221 Kan. 557, 564, 561 P.2d 805, 812 (1977).
58. La. Civ. Code arts. 473, 1759, 2441, 2449, 2456, 2457, and 2463.
59. La. Civ. Code art. 1832: "When the law requires a contract to be in written
form, the contract may not be proved by testimony or by presumption, unless the written
instrument has been destroyed, lost, or stolen."
60. Morris v. People's Bank & Trust Co., 580 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1991) (emphasis added).
61. 573 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990).
62. Id. at 487 (emphasis in original) (citing Campesi v. Marino, 506 So. 2d 177 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1987)). Furthermore, "[T]he Louisiana courts have long held that parol
evidence is admissible when there are allegations of fraud, error, or mistake, to show
that the instrument is not the expression of the actual intention of the parties." 573 So.
2d at 487 (emphasis in original) (citing Daigle & Assoc.. Inc. v. Coleman, 396 So. 2d
1270 (La. 1981); First Financial Bank, FSB v. Austin, 514 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 5th
Cir.), writ denied, 515 So. 2d 1112 (1987)).
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sought to prove through testimony that the written lease was not the
whole arrangement between it and Airco Industrial Gases ("AIG"),
particularly with regard to a waiver of warranty. Gulf was successful
in this effort. "Parol evidence is admissible to show that the parties
did not intend to substitute one written contract for all of their prior
negotiations and agreements and that the ... (writing) was not assented
to as [a] complete integration." 63 Regarding the waiver, the court recited
the standard known well by the bar: "In order for a waiver of implied
warranty to be effective, it must be 1) written in clear and unambiguous
terms; 2) contained in the written contract; and 3) brought to the
attention of the buyer or explained to him."' 4 Language in the contract
of lease read as follows: "AIG makes no representations or warranties
with respect to the Equipment other than that it shall meet the description
thereof set forth elsewhere in this Agreement." 6 The court considered
this insufficient to rise to the level of a waiver simply because Gulf
executed the contract; it is "so vague and misleading that it is
worthless. ... ."6
Waiving Matters Not Mentioned-Interpretation of Agreements
City of Rose City v. Nutmeg Insurance Co.67 presented the United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals the question whether an endorse-
ment to a certain policy of insurance issued by the Nutmeg Insurance
Company ("Nutmeg"), styled "Service of Suit," constituted Nutmeg's
waiver of its right to remove to federal court an action filed against
it." In Capital Bank & Trust Co. v. Associated International Insurance
Co.,69 the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louis-
iana decided in 1984 that a virtually identical endorsement precluded an
63. 573 So. 2d at 487 (citing Burton v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 152 So.
2d 235 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 244 La. 895, 154 So. 2d 767 (1963)).
64. 573 So. 2d at 488 (citing Prince v. Paretti Pontiac Co., 281 So. 2d 112 (La.
1973); Hendricks v. Horseless Carriage, Inc., 332 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976);
Reilly v. Gene Ducote Volkswagen, Inc., 549 So. 2d 428 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989)).
65. 573 So. 2d at 488.
66. Id. at 489.
67. 931 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1991).
68. The endorsement states, in part, as follows:
[Iln the event of our failure to pay any amount claimed to be due under your
policy, we, at your request agree to submit to the jurisdiction of any Court of
Competent jurisdiction within the United States and will comply with all re-
quirements necessary to give such Court jurisdiction and all matters arising
hereunder shall be determined in accordance with the law and practice of such
court .... [lIn any suit instituted against us upon this contract, we will abide
by the final decision of such Court or any Appellate Court in the event of any
appeal.
69. 576 F. Supp. 1522 (M.D. La. 1984).
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insurer from removing the action from state court, 70 for the endorsement
"restricts the defendant to the court in which suit is first begun against
it, be it federal or state."" This past term, the Fifth Circuit agreed
with this view and reversed the order of the district court denying the
City of Rose City's motion to remand. 2
In so ruling, the court rejected Nutmeg's reliance upon In re Delta
America Re Insurance Co." According to the panel, that case involved
defendants who were "reinsurance companies which were foreign cor-
porations not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of any court in the
United States . . . . 4 In contrast, the defendant in City of Rose City
v. Nutmeg Insurance Co. was a domestic insurer. Thus, it did not make
sense to the Fifth Circuit for the policy holder to bargain with the
insurer for a provision in the contract of insurance requiring Nutmeg
to submit to the jurisdiction of a court in the United States." This
much of the court's reasoning is not novel or unusual. There is, however,
a troubling aspect to the opinion-the slant that the language in the
"Service of Suit" clause operated as a "waiver" of rights as a matter
of law.' 6 Courts have traditionally required evidence that a person has
knowingly and clearly contractually waived rights." Certainly the en-
dorsement in question did not contain any expression of Nutmeg's
70. Id. at 1524.
71. General Phoenix Corp. v. Malyon, 88 F. Supp. 502, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (cited
in Capital Bank & Trust Co. v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., 576 F. Supp. at 1524).
72. In addition to Capital Bank & Trust Co. v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., 576 F.
Supp. 1522 (M.D. La. 1984), the Fifth Circuit cited with approval Perini Corp. v. Orion
Ins. Co., 331 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Cal. 1971), and General Phoenix Corp. v. Malyon, 88
F. Supp. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
73. 900 F.2d 890 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 233 (1990).
74. City of Rose City v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 13, 15 (5th Cir. 1991).
75. ITlhere was no question that Nutmeg would have to submit to the jurisdiction
of some court in the United States. Nutmeg is a Connecticut corporation with
its principal place of business in Hartford, Connecticut. Although the question
is not before us, so that we do not decide it, it seems quite likely that Nutmeg
has minimum contacts with Texas, and probably with other states as well, See
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed
95 (1945). It would have made no sense for a policyholder to bargain . .. for
a clause requiring only that Nutmeg would submit to the jurisdiction of some
court in the United States.
Id. at 15-16.
76. The court acknowledged that while the endorsement "does not ... mention the
right of a defendant to remove ... the language of the clause makes clear that the
policyholder shall enjoy the right to choose the forum in which any dispute will be heard."
Id. at 15.
77. E.g., Regis Associates v. Rank Hotels, Ltd., 894 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990); Kiddie
Rides U.S.A., Inc. v. Elektro-Mobiltechnik GMBH, 579 F. Supp. 1476 (C.D. II1. 1984);
Capital Bank & Trust Co. v. Associated Int'l Ins. Co., 576 F. Supp. 1522 (M.D. La.
1984).
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relinquishment of its choice to remove to federal court a suit filed
against it in state court." The Fifth Circuit may well have overreached
in justifying its conclusion.
The court should have distinguished the "Service of Suit" clause
from a forum-selection provision in a contract. The United States Su-
preme Court has ruled that courts should enforce the choices contained
in forum-selection clauses unless doing so would be unreasonable under
the circumstances. 79 "Service of Suit" clauses, however, are not forum-
selection devices.w0
In this regard, the case of Weltman v. Silna s' is helpful. Harry
Weltman brought an action in the circuit court for the City of St. Louis
against several persons who were involved with the Spirits of St. Louis
basketball club's seeking a share of the settlement proceeds resulting
from the 1976 merger agreement between the American and National
Basketball Associations. The defendants removed the action to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, invoking
diversity of citizenship as the basis for jurisdiction. Mr. Weltman con-
tested the removal, alleging that the defendants had waived their right
to remove the suit by reason of a provision in the partnership agreement
whereby the defendants consented to his filing suit in state court.8 2 The
district court rejected this argument and denied Mr. Weltman's motion
to remand. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The agreement "did not address
removal. Waiver of the right to remove must be 'clear and unequivocal,'
... and thus the district court properly rejected Weltman's claims that
the appellees waived their right to remove." 3
Similarly, Regis Associates v. Rank Hotels, Ltd." dealt with the
following scenario. Regis Associates ("Regis") contracted with Rank
Hotels, Ltd. ("Rank") for Rank to manage the Hotel St. Regis in
Detroit, Michigan. As part of their agreement, Regis and Rank included
a provision whereby they agreed to submit any differences "to the
78. See supra note 68.
79. M/S BREMEN v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 1907 (1972).
80. E.g., In re Delta American Re Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 890 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 233 (1990); Regis Associates v. Rank Hotels, Ltd., 894 F.2d 193 (6th Cir.
1990); Weltman v. Silna, 879 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1989); Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v.
Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1985); Keaty v. Freeport
Indonesia, Inc., 503 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1974); Links Design, Inc. v. Lahr, 731 F. Supp.
1535 (M.D. Fla. 1990); City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 477 F. Supp 438 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Wright v. Continental Casualty Co., 456 F. Supp. 1075 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
81. 879 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1989).
82. Id. at 427.
83. Id. (citing IA J. Moore, B. Ringle & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice
0.157[9J (2d ed. 1987)).
84. 894 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990).
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jurisdiction of the Michigan Courts.""3 When a dispute arose, Regis
filed a lawsuit in the Wayne County (Michigan) Circuit Court. Rank
removed the action to federal court, prompting Regis to move the court
to remand the action. Regis alleged that the above-quoted part of their
arrangement constituted Rank's waiver of the right to remove. The trial
court agreed with Regis and granted its motion. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit reversed" and made several interesting observations. First, "Al-
though the right to remove can be waived, the case law makes it clear
that such waiver must be clear and unequivocal." 8 Second, "The only
evidence that Rank waived the right to removal ... is that it did not
explicitly set forth the right of removal in the forum selection clause.
We find thisi to be of no evidentiary significance under the facts of this
case."" Third, the intent of the parties, "and particularly Regis, was
to make sure any litigation could be brought in Michigan so they would
not have to travel to England to litigate. The focus was never on which
Court (state or federal) in Michigan, but, rather in the broader sense,
which country would be the forum for litigation."' 9 Thus, the court
detected nothing that suggested any intent on the part of either party
to waive the right of removal. In addition, the court considered it
important that it was a concession on the part of Rank to submit to
the jurisdiction of the courts of Michigan, eliminating "any question
of personal jurisdiction that might have been implicated in litigation
involving a party incorporated in a foreign country." 9
The Fifth Circuit may well reconsider its sweeping pronouncements
in City of Rose City v. Nutmeg Insurance Co.91 That would be an
eventuality favorable to a more reasoned approach to contractual waiv-
ers.
Formalities of the Contract of Compromise
No one disputes the proposition that a transaction or a contract of
compromise is not perfected until it is reduced to writing. 92 The written
evidence of the transaction does not have to be one document or in
any particular form;93 one or two (or more) letters may be sufficient.
85. Id. at 194.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 195 (citations omitted).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 196.
91. 931 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1991). McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Lloyd's Underwriters of
London, No. 91-3568 (5th Cir.) also involves this question. The parties have argued the
case and are awaiting a decision. The author is one of the counsel for the appellants.
92. La. Civ. Code art. 3071 ("This contract must be ... reduced into writing . .
93. E.g., Audubon Ins. Co. v. Farr, 453 So. 2d 232 (La. 1984).
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Nevertheless, as the third circuit pointed out in American Bank & Trust
Co. v. Hannie,94 "the requirement that the agreement be reduced to
writing necessarily implies that the agreement be evidenced by docu-
mentation signed by both parties," 9 and "there must be a meeting of
the minds."' 9 The two factors mentioned by the court are part and
parcel of one of the necessities to any convention-consent. 97 In other
words, the parties to the contract of compromise must agree to its terms
and conditions. And they express their consent by signing the writing
that evidences the transaction.
94. 568 So. 2d 216 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), writ denied, 572 So. 2d 64 (1991).
95. Id. at 219 (citing Felder v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 405 So. 2d 521 (La. 1981);
Singleton v. Bunge Corp., 364 So. 2d 1321 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978)).
96. 568 So. 2d at 219 (citing Succession of Magnini, 450 So. 2d 972 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1984)).
97. La. Civ. Code art. 1927.

